带有说服的筛选
Screening with Persuasion
AI总结:
本文研究卖方同时控制定价与买方信息的最优机制,证明最优方案只需有限信号和商品,并通过合并买方价值、减少产品种类来降低信息租金,还给出了仅提供单一商品的条件。
摘要:
我们分析了一个非线性定价模型,其中卖方同时控制产品定价(筛选)和买方关于自身价值的信息(说服)。我们证明,即使买方价值是连续统,最优机制也总是由有限多个信号和商品组成。卖方最优地合并买方价值并减少产品种类,以最小化信息租金。我们表明,即使对于有限价值分布,只要其熵超过一个临界阈值,价值合并也是最优的。我们还提供了充分条件,在这些条件下最优菜单将供应限制为单一商品。
英文摘要:
We analyze a nonlinear pricing model where the seller controls both product pricing (screening) and buyer information about their own values (persuasion). We prove that the optimal mechanism always consists of finitely many signals and items, even with a continuum of buyer values. The seller optimally pools buyer values and reduces product variety to minimize informational rents. We show that value pooling is optimal even for finite value distributions if their entropy exceeds a critical threshold. We also provide sufficient conditions under which the optimal menu restricts offering to a single item.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。