AI 中文总结
研究垄断者通过产品不匹配筛选买家的问题，分析了不同情况下不匹配对信息租金的影响，指出最优分配由个体理性决定，不同条件下不匹配策略不同，能影响覆盖范围和利润。
AI 中文摘要
垄断者销售一系列产品，其变体从买家角度看是水平差异化的，但按生产成本排序。买家私下知道自己的理想产品，支付意愿可能与水平需求相关。卖家通过产品不匹配来筛选买家，而筛选内容决定了不匹配是增加还是减少信息租金。当买家仅在水平需求上有差异时，不匹配会增加租金；当支付意愿与水平需求相关时，不匹配会减少租金。由于不匹配是特定类型的，最优分配由个体理性而非仅激励相容性决定。
英文摘要
A monopolist sells a product line whose variants are horizontally differentiated from the buyers' perspective but ordered by production cost. Buyers privately know their ideal product, and willingness to pay may be correlated with horizontal need. The seller screens buyers through product mismatch, and what she must screen determines whether mismatch creates or reduces information rent. When buyers differ only in horizontal need, mismatch creates rent: the seller induces less mismatch, assigning served buyers products closer to their ideals than under the first best. When willingness to pay is correlated with horizontal need, mismatch instead reduces rent: the seller induces more mismatch, sells the basic product to buyers whose efficient products are advanced variants while excluding buyers better matched to it, and stronger horizontal differentiation can expand coverage and raise profit. Because mismatch is type-specific, optimal allocations are determined by individual rationality rather than by incentive compatibility alone.
