粗筛
Coarse Screening
AI总结:
卖方在设定价格前调查买方,平衡信息获取成本与定制合同的收益。最优信号粗略,无论类型空间多丰富,每个买方最多三种结果。该界限等于后信号决策的独立数量加一,称为有效策略维度。
摘要:
卖方在设定价格前调查买方,平衡信息获取成本与定制合同的收益。最优信号粗略,无论类型空间多丰富,每个买方最多三种结果。该界限等于后信号决策的独立数量加一,称为有效策略维度。筛查涉及两个决策,是否分配和收费,给出三元界限。有限责任是根源:没有它,价格由包络固定,仅剩分配决策,信号二元如监控。Myerson排除规则是未调查的产物。有调查,每个边际买方以正概率交易,由通用函数连接信息设计与理性不注意。该界限对任何严格凸的信息成本都成立。
英文摘要:
A seller investigates a buyer before setting prices, balancing the cost of acquiring information against the gain from tailoring the contract to the buyer's private type. The optimal signal is coarse: no matter how rich the type space, the seller never needs more than three outcomes per buyer. The bound equals the number of independent post-signal decisions plus one, a quantity we call the effective policy dimension. Screening involves two decisions, whether to allocate and what to charge, giving the ternary bound. Limited liability is the source: without it, the price is pinned by the envelope, only the allocation decision remains, and signals are binary as in monitoring. The Myerson exclusion rule is an artifact of not investigating. With investigation, every marginal buyer trades with positive probability, governed by a universal function that connects information design to rational inattention. The bound holds for any strictly convex information cost.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。