竞争下的筛选
Screening Under Competition
AI总结:
研究多个差异化产品企业竞争时,密度正则性条件确保企业最优反应是仅提供标价合同,否则标价可能非最优。
摘要:
我们研究多个企业向单位需求消费者提供同一商品的差异化品种时的竞争。消费者对不同企业的商品具有异质性估值。企业无法观察到消费者的确切估值,但知道其分布。企业同时发布合同菜单,之后消费者选择一家企业及其一个合同以最大化其效用。这定义了一个企业旨在最大化预期收益的博弈。我们引入一个充分条件——密度正则性,在该条件下,每个企业对其对手发布的任意菜单组合的最佳反应等价于发布仅包含标价合同的菜单。我们的结果并非单卖方经典Myersonian模型的直接扩展。一旦引入异质性偏好和竞争,文献中的标准论证就会失效。因此,我们采用最优控制方法,其中密度正则性条件对于建立标价的最优性至关重要。当该条件不成立时,标价可能不是最佳反应。
英文摘要:
We study competition among multiple firms that offer differentiated varieties of the same good to a unit-demand agent. The agent has heterogeneous valuations for goods from different firms. Firms do not observe the agent's exact valuations, but they know their distribution. Firms simultaneously post menus of contracts, after which the agent chooses a firm and one of its contracts to maximize her utility. This defines a game in which firms aim to maximize expected revenue. We introduce a sufficient condition, density-regularity, under which each firm's best response to any arbitrary menu profile posted by its opponents is equivalent to posting a menu that contains only a posted-price contract. Our result is not a direct extension of the canonical Myersonian model with a single seller. The standard argument in the literature breaks down once heterogeneous preferences and competition are introduced. We therefore adopt an optimal-control approach, in which the density-regularity condition is essential for establishing the optimality of posted prices. When this condition fails, posted prices may fail to be a best response.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。