竞争性顺序筛选
Competitive Sequential Screening
AI总结:
本文研究在消费者完全了解产品偏好前,企业通过提供合同菜单进行竞争的效率问题,分析了锁定效应及早期合同对消费者剩余的影响。
摘要:
我们研究在消费者完全了解其产品偏好之前,企业之间因合同而产生的竞争。在Hotelling双寡头模型中,企业通过提供合同菜单来筛选消费者。我们刻画了唯一的均衡。消费者从两家企业中选择合同。每个消费者会内生地锁定在选择具有较低起价的合同的那家企业。锁定导致效率低下消费。然而,更早的合同会加剧竞争,因为信息较少的消费者更同质。充分早的合同相对于现货定价提高了消费者剩余——这与垄断情况下的排名相反。独家合同进一步通过加剧竞争提高了消费者剩余。
英文摘要:
We study competition between firms that contract with consumers before the consumers fully learn their product preferences. In a Hotelling duopoly, firms screen consumers by offering menus of option contracts. We characterize the unique equilibrium. Consumers select contracts from both firms. Each consumer is endogenously locked into the firm from which he chooses an option with a lower strike price. Lock-in yields inefficient consumption. Yet earlier contracting stiffens competition because less informed consumers are more homogeneous. Sufficiently early contracting raises consumer surplus relative to spot pricing -- reversing the ranking under monopoly. Exclusive contracting further increases consumer surplus by intensifying competition.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。