存在逆向选择和道德风险不确定性的竞争下的最优契约
Optimal contracts under competition when uncertainty from adverse selection and moral hazard are present
摘要：
在一个连续时间的环境中，一个厌恶风险的代理人控制着由布朗运动驱动的输出过程的漂移，最优合同在终端输出中是线性的;这个结果在一个有道德风险的环境中是众所周知的-在更强的假设下-逆向选择。我们表明，这一结果继续持有时，另外保留公用事业是类型依赖的。这种类型的问题发生在研究最优补偿问题，涉及竞争的校长。
英文摘要：
In a continuous-time setting where a risk-averse agent controls the drift of an output process driven by a Brownian motion, optimal contracts are linear in the terminal output; this result is well-known in a setting with moral hazard and -under stronger assumptions - adverse selection. We show that this result continues to hold when in addition reservation utilities are type-dependent. This type of problem occurs in the study of optimal compensation problems involving competing principals.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
