arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv周末暂无论文更新,休息一下吧,周末愉快~~
arXiv 2602.18038cs.GTecon.TH
收藏

基于隐藏样本的定价

Pricing with a Hidden Sample

Shanghai University of Finance and Economics(上海财经大学);Georgia Institute of Technology(佐治亚理工学院)

Zhihao Gavin Tang, Yixin Tao, Shixin Wang

AI总结:

本文提出隐藏定价机制,通过单个隐藏样本实现先验独立定价,针对单调危险率分布获得约0.79的近似比,并统一了基于样本和统计量的鲁棒定价方法。

摘要:

我们研究了在单个买家面前出售单个物品的先验独立定价问题,当卖家只能从估值分布中获取一个样本时,而买家知道该分布。经典鲁棒定价方法要么依赖于分布统计量,通常需要许多样本来估计,要么直接使用揭示的样本来确定价格和分配。我们证明,通过利用买家的信息优势,这两种方法可以被桥梁连接:传统上要求卖家知道统计量如均值、$L^η$-范数或超分位数的定价策略,在我们的框架中可以仅使用一个隐藏样本来实现。我们引入了隐藏定价机制,其中卖家在买家参与决策前承诺基于一个样本的定价规则,该样本仅在买家参与决策后揭示。我们证明,每种凹定价策略都可以通过这种方式实现。为了评估性能保证,我们开发了一个通用的减少方法,用于分析单调定价策略在$α$-正则分布上的表现,从而能够对最坏情况实例进行可处理的刻画。使用此减少方法,我们刻画了最优单调隐藏定价机制,并计算了它们的近似比;特别是,我们获得了对于单调危险率(MHR)分布的近似比约为0.79。我们进一步建立了对于一般凹定价策略和所有先验独立机制的不可能性结果。最后,我们证明我们的框架也适用于基于统计量的鲁棒定价,从而将基于样本和基于统计量的方法统一起来。

英文摘要:

We study prior-independent pricing for selling a single item to a single buyer when the seller observes only a single sample from the valuation distribution, while the buyer knows the distribution. Classical robust pricing approaches either rely on distributional statistics, which typically require many samples to estimate, or directly use revealed samples to determine prices and allocations. We show that these two regimes can be bridged by leveraging the buyer's informational advantage: pricing policies that conventionally require the seller to know statistics such as the mean, $L^η$-norm, or superquantile can, in our framework, be implemented using only a single hidden sample. We introduce hidden pricing mechanisms, in which the seller commits ex ante to a pricing rule based on a single sample that is revealed only after the buyer's participation decision. We show that every concave pricing policy can be implemented in this way. To evaluate performance guarantees, we develop a general reduction for analyzing monotone pricing policies over $α$-regular distributions, enabling a tractable characterization of worst-case instances. Using this reduction, we characterize the optimal monotone hidden pricing mechanisms and compute their approximation ratios; in particular, we obtain an approximation ratio of approximately $0.79$ for monotone hazard rate (MHR) distributions. We further establish impossibility results for general concave pricing policies and for all prior-independent mechanisms. Finally, we show that our framework also applies to statistic-based robust pricing, thereby unifying sample-based and statistic-based approaches.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑