带有少量信息的拍卖设计
Auction Design with a Bit of Information
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中文总结 AI 辅助
该研究针对收益最大化卖家，探索三类不同维度的二元信号对拍卖收益的影响，发现最优竞争力信号在特定条件下收益不低于其他两类信号及任意二元信号。
中文摘要 AI 辅助
考虑一个追求收益最大化的卖家，该卖家可获取关于两个竞标者联合价值的二元信号。我们通过研究三类信号，探索对卖家最具价值的信息类型，每类信号对应竞标者价值的不同维度：整体水平（需求）、相对实力（排名）以及在保持竞标者匿名性的情况下的分散程度（竞争力）。我们刻画了每类信号中的最优信号及对应的拍卖机制，发现竞争力信号尤为有效。在某些正则性条件下，最优竞争力信号产生的收益至少与任何排名信号或需求信号的收益相当；此外，对于诱导单调分配的信号，最优竞争力信号产生的收益至少与任何其他二元信号的收益相当。
英文摘要
Consider a revenue-maximizing seller who can access a binary signal about two bidders` joint values. We explore what kind of information is most valuable to the seller by studying three classes of signals, each capturing a distinct dimension of bidders` values: their overall level (demand), their relative strength (ranking), and their dispersion while preserving bidder anonymity (competitiveness). We characterize the optimal signal and corresponding auction mechanism within each class, and find that competitiveness signals are particularly effective. Under certain regularity conditions, the optimal competitiveness signal yields at least as much revenue as any ranking signal or demand signal. Moreover, for signals that induce a monotone allocation, the optimal competitiveness signal yields at least as much revenue as any other binary signal.
