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arXiv 2110.08563econ.TH
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具有模糊性的拍卖设计:一价拍卖和全付拍卖的最优性

Auction design with ambiguity: Optimality of the first-price and all-pay auctions

Sosung Baik, Sung-Ha Hwang

摘要:

研究了投标人偏好服从最大最小期望效用模型时的最优拍卖设计问题。我们假设每个投标人的先验集合由接近卖方信念的信念组成,其中“接近度”由分歧定义。对于一个给定的分配规则,我们确定了一类最佳的转移候选人,命名为输赢相关的转移,具有以下属性:每种类型的投标人的转让条件的获胜或失败是独立的竞争对手的类型报告。我们的结果减少了无限维的最优转移问题的二维优化问题。通过解决简化问题,我们发现:(i)在没有对输家溢价的有效机制中,第一价格拍卖是最优的;(ii)在有效的赢家偏好机制中,每个投标人在获胜时支付的金额比失败时支付的金额更少:全付拍卖是最优的。在一个简化的假设下,这两个拍卖仍然是最优的内生分配规则。

英文摘要:

We study the optimal auction design problem when bidders' preferences follow the maxmin expected utility model. We suppose that each bidder's set of priors consists of beliefs close to the seller's belief, where "closeness" is defined by a divergence. For a given allocation rule, we identify a class of optimal transfer candidates, named the win-lose dependent transfers, with the following property: each type of bidder's transfer conditional on winning or losing is independent of the competitor's type report. Our result reduces the infinite-dimensional optimal transfer problem to a two-dimensional optimization problem. By solving the reduced problem, we find that: (i) among efficient mechanisms with no premiums for losers, the first-price auction is optimal; and, (ii) among efficient winner-favored mechanisms where each bidder pays smaller amounts when she wins than loses: the all-pay auction is optimal. Under a simplifying assumption, these two auctions remain optimal under the endogenous allocation rule.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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