We study the optimal auction design problem when bidders' preferences follow the maxmin expected utility model. We suppose that each bidder's set of priors consists of beliefs close to the seller's belief, where "closeness" is defined by a divergence. For a given allocation rule, we identify a class of optimal transfer candidates, named the win-lose dependent transfers, with the following property: each type of bidder's transfer conditional on winning or losing is independent of the competitor's type report. Our result reduces the infinite-dimensional optimal transfer problem to a two-dimensional optimization problem. By solving the reduced problem, we find that: (i) among efficient mechanisms with no premiums for losers, the first-price auction is optimal; and, (ii) among efficient winner-favored mechanisms where each bidder pays smaller amounts when she wins than loses: the all-pay auction is optimal. Under a simplifying assumption, these two auctions remain optimal under the endogenous allocation rule.
Market Design Center, Graduate School of Economics, The University of Tokyo(东京大学经济学研究市场设计中心);Graduate School of Informatics and Engineering, The University of Electro-Communications(电波大学信息工程研究生院)
All-Pay Auctions as Models for Trade Wars and Military Annexation
Massachusetts Institute of Technology(麻省理工学院);University of Illinois at Chicago(伊利诺伊大学芝加哥分校);University of California, Berkeley(加州大学伯克利分校);Mathematics Sciences Research Institute(数学科学研究所)
Università Bocconi(博科尼大学);Google Research(谷歌研究);Stanford University, Graduate School of Business(斯坦福大学商学院);Department of Economics, Harvard University(哈佛大学经济学系)
Exact Budget Balance via Payment-Rule Ambiguity: Incentive Preservation, Transfer Capacity, and Participation
Market Design Center, Graduate School of Economics, The University of Tokyo(东京大学经济学研究市场设计中心);Graduate School of Informatics and Engineering, The University of Electro-Communications(电波大学信息工程学研究生院)
Equity in auction design with unit-demand agents and non-quasilinear preferences
Graduate School of Economics, Kyoto University(京都大学经济学研究科);Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi(印度统计学院德里分院);Faculty of Economics, Osaka University of Economics(大阪经济大学经济学部)
Johannes Kepler University Linz(林茨约翰·开普勒大学);Austrian Institute of Economic Research(奥地利经济研究所);Inria/FairPlay(法国国家信息与自动化研究所/公平游戏实验室);Tel Aviv University(特拉维夫大学);Maison Française d’Oxford, CNRS and Department of Economics, University of Oxford(牛津法国之家、法国国家科学研究中心及牛津大学经济学系)
Learning to Coordinate Bidders in Non-Truthful Auctions
Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, School of Computing and Artificial Intelligence, Key Laboratory of Interdisciplinary Research of Computation and Economics(上海财经大学,计算机与人工智能学院,计算与经济学交叉研究重点实验室);Microsoft Research & The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen(微软研究院及香港中文大学(深圳))
Strategyproofness and Monotone Allocation of Auction in Social Networks
SCSE, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China(电子科技大学信息与通信工程学院);AI-HSS, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China(电子科技大学人工智能与社会科学学院);SCSE, Nanjing University of Science and Technology(南京理工大学信息工程学院);University of New South Wales(新南威尔士大学)
Auction-based allocation of routes in capacity-constrained networks
HUN-REN Institute for Computer Science and Control(匈牙利科学院计算机与控制研究所);Budapest University of Technology and Economics(布达佩斯技术与经济大学);ELTE Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Institute of Economics(罗兰大学经济与区域研究中心经济学研究所);Pázmány Péter Catholic University, Faculty of Information Technology and Bionics(帕兹曼·彼得天主教大学信息与仿生技术学院)