AI 中文总结
本文研究通过支付规则模糊性修复激励相容机制的支付侧以实现精确预算平衡，探讨了不同信息条件下的可行性、转移能力及参与度等问题。
AI 中文摘要
本文探究能否修复激励相容机制的支付侧，使每个已实现结算精确平衡，同时在维持最坏情况评估下的配置及所有逐报告比较保持不变。报告前，设计者承诺一组支付规则和一个报告盲选协议，逐点保持条件可延续占优策略激励。在全支撑共同参考下，仅当原规则已平衡时，精确已知的标签律才允许修复；而即使一个非最坏标签的频率不确定性也会使所有非赤字规则可修复。在共同剩余模糊基准下，正剩余状态下每个保持精确平衡的有限菜单，随着认证频率信息更严格，需要更多转移能力。在规范菜单中，固定转移上限，当模糊性消失时，最佳可实现平衡会向原剩余恶化；当仅认证可能标签时，两个标签足够。适当平衡的划分还可为非负支付保留原上限，并在每个已实现规则下保持个体理性。但在正收益维克里状态下，当每个代理人的保持分布具有全支撑时，该保证不可能实现。因此，频率信息以不同方式改变可行性、流动性和已实现参与度。
英文摘要
This paper asks whether the payment side of an incentive-compatible mechanism can be repaired so that every realized settlement balances exactly while the allocation and all report-by-report comparisons under the maintained worst-case evaluation remain unchanged. Before reports, the designer commits to a menu of payment rules and a report-blind selection protocol. A pointwise preservation condition then carries over dominant-strategy incentives. Under a full-support common reference, a precisely known label law permits repair only if the original rule already balances, whereas frequency uncertainty about even one non-worst label makes every non-deficit rule repairable. Under the common residual-ambiguity benchmark, every preserving, exactly balanced finite menu at a positive-surplus state requires more transfer capacity as certified frequency information becomes tighter. In the canonical menu, fixing the transfer cap makes the best attainable balance deteriorate toward the original surplus as ambiguity vanishes. When only the possible labels are certified, two labels suffice. Suitably balanced partitions can also retain the original cap for nonnegative payments and preserve individual rationality under every realized rule. This last guarantee is impossible in positive-revenue Vickrey states when each agent's preserving distribution has full support. Frequency information therefore changes feasibility, liquidity, and realized participation in distinct ways.
Comments54 pages, 1 figure; includes appendices and ancillary verification code
