发表机构
Yokohama City University; Meiji Gakuin University（横滨市立大学; 明治学院大学）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
该研究指出，向卖方隐瞒拍卖中失败者的价值信息会破坏拍卖可信度，确定性协议下卖方可操纵获胜者付款增加收入，强制出售时可信升价协议会揭示失败者价值。
AI 中文摘要
第二价格拍卖必须确定其价格，但无需了解失败者的价值低于该价格多少。我们表明，向卖方隐瞒此信息与拍卖可信度相冲突。在具有私人通信的确定性协议中，下尾隐私要求第一个信息性问题揭示投标人是否具有最高可能价值。然后，卖方可以操纵获胜者的付款，而不会有任何投标人检测到偏差，在某些估值配置文件中增加收入，且永远不会减少收入。降价协议会隐藏价格以下的失败者价值，但允许操纵；强制出售时，可信的升价协议会揭示这些价值。
英文摘要
A second-price auction must determine its price but need not learn how far losing values lie below it. We show that protecting this information from the seller conflicts with auction credibility. In deterministic protocols with private communication, lower-tail privacy forces the first informative question to reveal whether a bidder has the highest possible value. The seller can then manipulate the winner's payment without any bidder detecting the deviation, increasing revenue at some valuation profiles and never reducing it. A descending protocol conceals losing values below the price but permits manipulation; with mandatory sale, a credible ascending protocol reveals them.
Comments26 pages, 1 figure. Includes appendices and supplemental appendix
