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arXiv 2404.08762econ.TH
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预算受限买家的竞争:全支付拍卖探究

Competition for Budget-Constrained Buyers: Exploring All-Pay Auctions

Cemil Selcuk

AI总结:

本研究分析了存在不同到店率的受预算约束与不受约束买家、买家类型为私人信息的店铺内全支付拍卖结果,并探究竞争性搜索环境下首价、次价、全支付拍卖的形式选择,发现预算约束不严时全支付拍卖是唯一对称均衡的优选形式。

摘要:

本研究有两个核心目标。首先,我们分析了某店铺内的全支付拍卖结果,该场景中存在受资金约束和不受资金约束的两类买家,两类买家到店率各不相同,且买家类型属于私人信息。其次,我们在竞争性搜索环境下研究了拍卖形式的选择问题,涉及的拍卖形式包括首价拍卖、次价拍卖和全支付拍卖,该环境中卖家会设法吸引顾客。研究结果表明,若预算约束的限制程度不高,全支付规则会成为唯一对称均衡中的首选售卖形式。这是因为全支付规则能促使买家提交更低的出价,从而普遍规避预算约束,同时还能让卖家收取所有出价。

英文摘要:

This note pursues two primary objectives. First, we analyze the outcomes of an all-pay auction within a store where buyers with and without financial constraints arrive at varying rates, and where buyer types are private information. Second, we investigate the selection of an auction format (comprising first-price, second-price, and all-pay formats) in a competitive search setting, where sellers try to attract customers. Our results indicate that if the budget constraint is not too restrictive, the all-pay rule emerges as the preferred selling format in the unique symmetric equilibrium. This is thanks to its ability to prompt buyers to submit lower bids, thereby generally avoiding budget constraints, while allowing the seller to collect all bids.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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