arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv周末暂无论文更新,休息一下吧,周末愉快~~
arXiv 2002.03492econ.TH
收藏

全支付拍卖作为贸易战与军事吞并的模型

All-Pay Auctions as Models for Trade Wars and Military Annexation

Massachusetts Institute of Technology(麻省理工学院);University of Illinois at Chicago(伊利诺伊大学芝加哥分校);University of California, Berkeley(加州大学伯克利分校);Mathematics Sciences Research Institute(数学科学研究所)

Benjamin Kang, James Unwin

AI总结:

本文应用全支付拍卖模型研究贸易战与领土吞并,设定预期实力公开而实际资源私有,推导了不同场景下两国冲突的准均衡策略,为 US-China 贸易战等冲突提供理论参考。

摘要:

我们探讨了全支付拍卖在建模贸易战与领土吞并中的应用。具体而言,在该模型中,我们设定预期的资源、生产力及攻击性(军事/关税)实力为公开信息,但实际资源水平为私人知识。我们考察了此类竞争结束时的资源转移,这剥夺了较弱国家部分原有资源。特别地,我们推导了不同场景下两国冲突的准均衡策略。本研究与正在进行的 US-China 贸易战、近期的 Russian 吞并 Crimea,以及历史和未来的冲突均具有相关性。

英文摘要:

We explore an application of all-pay auctions to model trade wars and territorial annexation. Specifically, in the model we consider the expected resource, production, and aggressive (military/tariff) power are public information, but actual resource levels are private knowledge. We consider the resource transfer at the end of such a competition which deprives the weaker country of some fraction of its original resources. In particular, we derive the quasi-equilibria strategies for two country conflicts under different scenarios. This work is relevant for the ongoing US-China trade war, and the recent Russian capture of Crimea, as well as historical and future conflicts.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑