带昂贵进入成本的重复拍卖:理论与证据
Recurring Auctions with Costly Entry: Theory and Evidence
AI总结:
本文研究存在进入成本时的重复拍卖,证明其分类进入机制可提升效率与收入、刻画最优保留价序列,并基于中国房屋止赎拍卖量化显著收益。
摘要:
重复拍卖在出售艺术品和房屋等耐用品时普遍存在,未售出物品会举行后续拍卖。我们从理论和实证两方面研究此类拍卖。理论分析表明,当买方面临进入成本时,重复拍卖优于单轮拍卖;由于潜在买方的分类进入,其提升了效率和收入。本文刻画了最优保留价格序列。来自中国房屋止赎拍卖的实证结果显示,与单轮拍卖相比,采用重复拍卖每年在效率(34.0亿美元,16.60%)和收入(29.7亿美元,15.92%)方面均带来显著增益。实施最优保留价格可进一步提升效率(3.35%)和收入(3.06%)。
英文摘要:
Recurring auctions are ubiquitous for selling durable assets like artworks and homes, with follow-up auctions held for unsold items. We investigate such auctions theoretically and empirically. Theoretical analysis demonstrates that recurring auctions outperform single-round auctions when buyers face entry costs, enhancing efficiency and revenue due to sorted entry of potential buyers. Optimal reserve price sequences are characterized. Empirical findings from home foreclosure auctions in China reveal significant annual gains in efficiency (3.40 billion USD, 16.60%) and revenue (2.97 billion USD, 15.92%) using recurring auctions compared to single-round auctions. Implementing optimal reserve prices can further improve efficiency (3.35%) and revenue (3.06%).
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。