arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv周末暂无论文更新,休息一下吧,周末愉快~~
arXiv 2002.02599econ.TH
收藏

支付拍卖与不同罚金

All-Pay Auctions with Different Forfeits

Massachusetts Institute of Technology(麻省理工学院);University of Illinois Chicago(伊利诺伊大学芝加哥分校);University of California, Berkeley(加州大学伯克利分校)

Benjamin Kang, James Unwin

AI总结:

本文研究了不同罚金机制的支付拍卖模型,探讨其在现实竞争中的应用。

摘要:

在拍卖中,每个参与者都会报出一定金额,报价最高的获胜。有趣的是,拍卖也可以作为其他现实系统模型。在支付拍卖中,所有参与者必须为报价支付罚金。在最常研究的支付拍卖中,参与者必须支付全部报价,这种模式被视为政治竞选支出的模型。本文考虑了多种替代罚金,可能用于不同现实竞争的模型,例如准备国防或基础设施合同的投标。

英文摘要:

In an auction each party bids a certain amount and the one which bids the highest is the winner. Interestingly, auctions can also be used as models for other real-world systems. In an all pay auction all parties must pay a forfeit for bidding. In the most commonly studied all pay auction, parties forfeit their entire bid, and this has been considered as a model for expenditure on political campaigns. Here we consider a number of alternative forfeits which might be used as models for different real-world competitions, such as preparing bids for defense or infrastructure contracts.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑