拍卖中的风险规避性分析
On Risk Aversion in Auctions
AI总结：
本文研究了风险规避对拍卖投标策略的影响，发现第一价格拍卖中高报价更受青睐，而第二价格拍卖中低报价更受青睐，基于不同的收益条件。
摘要：
我们提供了一种统一的方法来分析风险规避如何影响拍卖中的投标行为，通过探讨当投标人更加风险规避时哪些投标变得更具吸引力。在第一价格拍卖中，在两个收益条件下——赢得比赛永远不比外部选项差，以及以低报价赢得比仅以高报价赢得更可取——更大的风险规避会使高报价更具吸引力。在具有已知外部选项的第二价格拍卖中，增加投标会增加在赢得比赛的条件下风险暴露，因此更大的风险规避倾向于选择较低的报价。我们展示了这些投标层面的力矩转化为相应的均衡比较静态分析。
英文摘要：
We provide a unifying way to analyze how risk aversion changes bidding in auctions by asking which bids become more attractive as bidders become more risk averse. In first-price auctions, under two payoff conditions--winning is never worse than the outside option, and winning with a low bid is preferable to winning only with a high bid--greater risk aversion makes high bids more appealing. In second-price auctions with a known outside option, bidding more increases risk exposure conditional on winning, so greater risk aversion favors lower bids. We show these bid-level forces translate into corresponding equilibrium comparative statics.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
