严格正联盟博弈的偏序以及从风险规避到合作的联系
A Partial Order for Strictly Positive Coalitional Games and a Link from Risk Aversion to Cooperation
AI总结：
本文为严格正联盟博弈建立基于分数配置与“向心性”的偏序，并借此说明风险规避如何通过正齐次奖励函数促进合作。
摘要：
我们研究具有严格正价值的联盟博弈。此类博弈的个体理性配置具有清晰的分数解释。许多概念，包括长期存在的核心以及 Yang \cite{Y22} 最近提出的其他稳定性概念，都可以在这种分数模式下重新表述。后者允许博弈之间存在某种排序，我们将其视为“向心性”意义上的排序，用以表明博弈稳定解中可清晰描述的转移。当联盟的价值同时建立在随机结果和刻画参与者从其份额中获得享受的共同正齐次奖励函数之上时，上述联系可以帮助解释为什么对风险的规避通常会促进合作。
英文摘要：
We deal with coalitional games possessing strictly positive values. Individually rational allocations of such a game has clear fractional interpretations. Many concepts, including the long-existing core and other stability notions more recently proposed by Yang \cite{Y22}, can all be re-cast in this fractional mode. The latter allows a certain ranking between games, which we deem as in the sense of ``centripetality'', to imply a clearly describable shift in the games' stable solutions. %These trends would be preserved after the imposition of the restriction that fractions be positive as well. When coalitions' values are built on both random outcomes and a common positively homogeneous reward function characterizing players' enjoyments from their shares, the above link could help explain why aversion to risk often promotes cooperation.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
