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arXiv 2409.04047econ.TH
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带数量约束的统一价格拍卖

Uniform price auction with quantity constraints

Department of Economics, Korea University(韩国大学经济系)

Kiho Yoon

AI总结:

研究多异质投标者具有平坦需求且受各自数量约束时的统一价格拍卖均衡,提出一种迭代过程系统性地找到均衡结果以及一个升序拍卖机制,并证明低价格均衡是唯一可能均衡。

摘要:

我们研究了统一价格拍卖的均衡,其中许多不对称的投标者具有平坦需求,直至其各自的数量约束。我们提出了一种迭代过程,系统地找到均衡结果,以及一个升序拍卖,该拍卖将此结果作为占优策略均衡结果。需求减少和低价格均衡可能发生,因为投标者放弃部分需求并以低价获得剩余需求比以更高价格获得全部需求更有利。我们表明,当没有投标者的数量约束大到足以覆盖供给时,低价格均衡是唯一可能的均衡。

英文摘要:

We study the equilibria of uniform price auctions where many asymmetric bidders have flat demands up to their respective quantity constraints. We present an iterative procedure that systematically finds an equilibrium outcome as well as an ascending auction that has this outcome as a dominant strategy equilibrium outcome. Demand reduction and low price equilibrium may occur since it is advantageous for a bidder to give up some of his/her demand and get the remaining demand at a low price rather than to get his/her entire demand at a higher price. We show that a low price equilibrium is the only possible equilibrium when no bidder's quantity constraint is large enough to cover the supply.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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