竞争均衡与双向拍卖
Competitive equilibrium and the double auction
摘要：
在本文中，我们重新审视共同主张，双向拍卖必然产生竞争均衡。我们首先观察到，竞争均衡有一些违反直觉的含义：具体来说，它预测价值分布的单调变化可以保持价格不变。通过实验，我们测试这些影响是否被数据所证实。我们发现，在固定价值分布的双向拍卖，最终的价格可以远离竞争均衡。我们还表明，我们的反例的有效性是钝化时，交易员可以离开没有更换随着时间的推移。综上所述，这些研究结果表明，“马歇尔路径”对于在双向拍卖中产生均衡价格至关重要。
英文摘要：
In this paper, we revisit the common claim that double auctions necessarily generate competitive equilibria. We begin by observing that competitive equilibrium has some counterintuitive implications: specifically, it predicts that monotone shifts in the value distribution can leave prices unchanged. Using experiments, we then test whether these implications are borne out by the data. We find that in double auctions with stationary value distributions, the resulting prices can be far from competitive equilibria. We also show that the effectiveness of our counterexamples is blunted when traders can leave without replacement as time progresses. Taken together, these findings suggest that the `Marshallian path' is crucial for generating equilibrium prices in double auctions.
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