稳健的双向拍卖机制
Robust double auction mechanisms
AI总结：
本文刻画了满足占优策略激励相容、事后个体理性和事后预算平衡的稳健双向拍卖机制，证明在非独断性等假设下广义挂牌价格机制是唯一形式。
摘要：
我们研究稳健的双向拍卖机制，即满足占优策略激励相容、事后个体理性和事后预算平衡的双向拍卖机制。我们首先证明，在任何稳健机制中，价格不依赖于交易参与者的估值。接着我们证明，在非独断性假设下，任何稳健机制中的价格完全不依赖于参与者的估值，无论其是否参与交易。我们的主要结果是刻画性结论：在非独断性假设以及关于机制性质的其他假设下，广义挂牌机制——即为每一种可能的交易者集合挂牌一个固定价格——是唯一的稳健双向拍卖机制。我们还表明，即使没有非独断性假设，除了广义挂牌价格机制之外，也很难找到合理的稳健双向拍卖机制。
英文摘要：
We study the robust double auction mechanisms, that is, the double auction mechanisms that satisfy dominant strategy incentive compatibility, ex-post individual rationality and ex-post budget balance. We first establish that the price in any robust mechanism does not depend on the valuations of the trading players. We next establish that, with a non-bossiness assumption, the price in any robust mechanism does not depend on players' valuations at all, whether trading or non-trading. Our main result is the characterization result that, with a non-bossy assumption along with other assumptions on the properties of the mechanism, the generalized posted mechanism in which a constant price is posted for each possible set of traders is the only robust double auction mechanism. We also show that, even without the non-bossiness assumption, it is quite difficult to find a reasonable robust double auction mechanism other than the generalized posted price mechanism.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
