样本平均出价拍卖
Finite-Sample Average Bid Auction
摘要:
本文研究了拍卖师仅通过统计样本获得估价分布知识的拍卖设计问题。将统计决策理论与机制设计相结合,建立了一个新的机制设计框架。两个最优性标准,最大最小,和方差,研究了拍卖的形式,以及它们的影响。等变拍卖最简单的形式是平均出价拍卖,它将个人保留价格与其他出价和历史样本的平均值成比例。这种形式的拍卖可以由伽马分布的动机,它揭示了新的光的最优价格的估计,一个不规则的参数。理论结果表明,经常可以使用正则参数总体均值来逼近最优价格。在此基础上,提出了一种自适应平均出价估计,它具有与经验Myerson估计相同的渐近性质。当样本量较小时,新提出的估计量在风险价值和预期损失方面具有显著更好的性能。
英文摘要:
The paper studies the problem of auction design in a setting where the auctioneer accesses the knowledge of the valuation distribution only through statistical samples. A new framework is established that combines the statistical decision theory with mechanism design. Two optimality criteria, maxmin, and equivariance, are studied along with their implications on the form of auctions. The simplest form of the equivariant auction is the average bid auction, which set individual reservation prices proportional to the average of other bids and historical samples. This form of auction can be motivated by the Gamma distribution, and it sheds new light on the estimation of the optimal price, an irregular parameter. Theoretical results show that it is often possible to use the regular parameter population mean to approximate the optimal price. An adaptive average bid estimator is developed under this idea, and it has the same asymptotic properties as the empirical Myerson estimator. The new proposed estimator has a significantly better performance in terms of value at risk and expected shortfall when the sample size is small.
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