截断成交价格拍卖中的识别
Identification in Auctions with Truncated Transaction Prices
AI总结：
本文研究截断成交价格下拍卖的非参数识别，发现信息结构影响可识别性，并推广至含进入成本的拍卖。
摘要：
我在多种信息结构下，当成交价格被具有约束力的保留价截断时，建立了第一价格和第二价格拍卖中的非参数识别结果。当潜在投标人数在所有拍卖中固定且已知时，如果仅观察到成交价格，则在第二价格拍卖中可识别投标人的私人价值分布，但在第一价格拍卖中不可识别。若观察到活跃投标人数或无成交拍卖数，则可实现第一价格拍卖中的识别。当潜在投标人数在不同拍卖间变化且未知时，若同时观察到成交价格和活跃投标人数，则在第一价格拍卖中可识别投标人的私人价值分布，但在第二价格拍卖中不可识别。我将类似结果推广至具有进入成本的拍卖，当未进入的潜在投标人数据缺失时，此类拍卖面临类似的截断问题。
英文摘要：
I establish nonparametric identification results in first- and second-price auctions when transaction prices are truncated by a binding reserve price under a range of information structures. When the number of potential bidders is fixed and known across all auctions, if only the transaction price is observed, the bidders' private-value distribution is identified in second-price auctions but not in first-price auctions. Identification in first-price auctions can be achieved if either the number of active bidders or the number of auctions with no sales is observed. When the number of potential bidders varies across auctions and is unknown, the bidders' private-value distribution is identified in first-price auctions but not in second-price auctions, provided that both the transaction price and the number of active bidders are observed. I derive analogous results to auctions with entry costs, which face a similar truncation issue when data on potential bidders who do not enter are missing.
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