采购拍卖中的投机行为
Speculation in Procurement Auctions
AI总结:
研究发现,在第二价格拍卖中投机总是有利可图,而在第一价格拍卖中可能不盈利,且投机行为损害效率,以拍卖师的损失为代价。
摘要:
投机者可以通过在拍卖前购买待售物品来利用采购拍卖。积累的市场力量可以在拍卖中发挥作用,可能导致足够的收益以覆盖购买成本。我证明在第二价格拍卖中,投机总是产生正的预期利润,但在第一价格拍卖中可能不盈利。在第一价格拍卖中投机有利的情况下,第二价格拍卖更具盈利性。这种盈利性比较是由两种拍卖机制不同的竞争模式驱动的。在福利方面,投机导致私人价值破坏并损害效率。卖家从投机者提供的购买报价中受益。因此,投机以拍卖师的损失为代价。
英文摘要:
A speculator can take advantage of a procurement auction by acquiring items for sale before the auction. The accumulated market power can then be exercised in the auction and may lead to a large enough gain to cover the acquisition costs. I show that speculation always generates a positive expected profit in second-price auctions but could be unprofitable in first-price auctions. In the case where speculation is profitable in first-price auctions, it is more profitable in second-price auctions. This comparison in profitability is driven by different competition patterns in the two auction mechanisms. In terms of welfare, speculation causes private value destruction and harms efficiency. Sellers benefit from the acquisition offer made by the speculator. Therefore, speculation comes at the expense of the auctioneer.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。