具有数据驱动错误规格的拍卖设计
Auction Design with Data-Driven Misspecifications
摘要:
我们考虑拍卖环境中,在拍卖时,投标人观察到的信号,他们的事后价值。我们引入了一个模型的新手投标人谁不知道知道的联合分布的信号,而是建立一个统计模型,其他人的出价,以自己的事后价值从数据集访问从过去类似的拍卖。至关重要的是,我们假设只有事后价值和出价是可访问的,而在过去的拍卖中观察到的投标人的信号保持私人。我们认为在这样的环境中的稳态,重要的是,我们允许在信号分布的相关性。我们首先观察到,数据驱动的投标人可能会表现出次优的经典拍卖,如第二价格或第一价格拍卖时,有相关性。允许混合的理性(或有经验的)和数据驱动(新手)投标人在这种拍卖的效率低下,我们的效率低下扩展到所有的拍卖机制,投标人被限制提交一维(实值)出价。
英文摘要:
We consider auction environments in which at the time of the auction bidders observe signals about their ex-post value. We introduce a model of novice bidders who do not know know the joint distribution of signals and instead build a statistical model relating others' bids to their own ex post value from the data sets accessible from past similar auctions. Crucially, we assume that only ex post values and bids are accessible while signals observed by bidders in past auctions remain private. We consider steady-states in such environments, and importantly we allow for correlation in the signal distribution. We first observe that data-driven bidders may behave suboptimally in classical auctions such as the second-price or first-price auctions whenever there are correlations. Allowing for a mix of rational (or experienced) and data-driven (novice) bidders results in inefficiencies in such auctions, and we show the inefficiency extends to all auction-like mechanisms in which bidders are restricted to submit one-dimensional (real-valued) bids.
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