信念聚合规则的操纵
Manipulation of Belief Aggregation Rules
AI总结:
本文研究社会先收集个体概率意见再基于聚合信念进行公共投资组合选择时的信念聚合规则操纵问题,证明线性意见池与对数效用下纳什均衡报告等价于风险中性parimutuel均衡的财富份额,并给出独立于共同风险态度的可纳什实施条件。
摘要:
本文研究在如下情境中对信念聚合规则的操纵:社会首先收集个体的概率性意见,然后基于聚合信念,在共同效用下求解一个公共投资组合选择问题。首先,我们证明在线性意见池和对数效用下,纳什均衡中的信念报告可被识别为具有风险中性偏好的帕里穆图埃尔(parimutuel)均衡中的状态依存财富份额配置。随后,我们刻画了可被纳什实施的信念聚合规则。我们给出了可实施性的一个必要条件和一个本质上充分的条件,该条件独立于共同的风险态度。
英文摘要:
This paper studies manipulation of belief aggregation rules in the setting where the society first collects individual's probabilistic opinions and then solves a public portfolio choice problem with common utility based on the aggregate belief. First, we show that belief reporting in Nash equilibrium under the linear opinion pool and log utility is identified as the profile of state-contingent wealth shares in parimutuel equilibrium with risk-neutral preference. Then we characterize belief aggregation rules which are Nash-implementable. We provide a necessary and essentially sufficient condition for implementability, which is independent of the common risk attitude.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。