信息型独裁者与多元社会
Informational Autocrats, Diverse Societies
AI总结:
该研究基于贝叶斯说服框架构建理论模型,分析不同社会形态下独裁者的信息操纵策略,发现社会偏好与信念越多元,独裁者的信息操纵越少,指出态度与观点多样性可抵御敌对者的信息操纵。
摘要:
本文提出了一个关于独裁者控制媒体以试图说服社会相信其能力的理论模型。我们的分析基于贝叶斯说服(Bayesian persuasion)框架,其中公民对独裁者有着异质的偏好与信念。我们刻画了当社会处于单一形态以及分裂状态时,独裁者的信息操纵策略。当社会中的偏好与信念更加多元时,独裁者实施的信息操纵会更少。因此我们的研究结果表明,态度与观点的多样性可以作为抵御敌对行为者信息操纵的壁垒。
英文摘要:
This paper presents a theoretical model of an autocrat who controls the media in an attempt to persuade society of his competence. We base our analysis on a Bayesian persuasion framework in which citizens have heterogeneous preferences and beliefs about the autocrat. We characterize the autocrat's information manipulation strategy when society is monolithic and when it is divided. When the preferences and beliefs in society are more diverse, the autocrat engages in less information manipulation. Our findings thus suggest that the diversity of attitudes and opinions can act as a bulwark against information manipulation by hostile actors.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。