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arXiv 2201.01149econ.THcs.GT
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带有信息惩罚的机制设计

Mechanism Design with Informational Punishment

Benjamin Balzer, Johannes Schneider

AI总结:

本文提出信息惩罚机制,通过允许参与者延迟发送混淆公开信息且他人无法忽略,确保在与外生现状机制竞争时实现完全参与,且该机制独立于设计者目标、仅在均衡路径外运作,并具有稳健性。

摘要:

我们将信息惩罚引入到与外生现状机制竞争的机制设计中:参与者可以延迟发送混淆的公开信息,且其他人无法承诺忽略这些信息。最优的信息惩罚确保了完全参与是无损的,即使任何单个参与者都能公开强制执行现状机制。信息惩罚允许使用标准的显示原理,独立于机制设计者的目标,且仅在均衡路径之外运作。它对精炼具有稳健性,并适用于知情委托人设定。我们提供了使其对机会主义信号设计者具有稳健性的条件。

英文摘要:

We introduce \emph{informational punishment} to the design of mechanisms that compete with an exogenous status quo mechanism: Players can send garbled public messages with some delay, and others cannot commit to ignoring them. Optimal informational punishment ensures that full participation is without loss, even if any single player can publicly enforce the status quo mechanism. Informational punishment permits using a standard revelation principle, is independent of the mechanism designer's objective, and operates exclusively off the equilibrium path. It is robust to refinements and applies in informed-principal settings. We provide conditions that make it robust to opportunistic signal designers.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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