Strength in Numbers: 多智能体公共品供给的稳健机制
Strength in Numbers: Robust Mechanisms for Public Goods with Many Agents
AI总结:
本文提出调整均值阈值(AMT)机制,解决大型经济体中公共品供给的机制设计问题,该机制在成本增长慢于√n速率时实现预算平衡与渐近有效,且仅依赖估值分布一阶矩,信息稳健性优于次优机制。
摘要:
本研究考察了在一个包含 $n$ 个独立智能体的大型经济体中公共品供给的机制设计问题。我们提出了一类占优策略激励相容且事后个体理性的机制,称之为调整均值阈值(AMT)机制。我们证明,当供给成本的增长慢于 $\sqrt{n}$ 速率时,AMT 机制既是最终事前预算平衡的,又是渐近有效的。相反,当成本增长快于 $\sqrt{n}$ 速率时,我们证明任何激励相容、个体理性且最终事前预算平衡的机制,其供给概率必然收敛于零,因此不可能渐近有效。AMT 机制形式简单,且与例如次优机制相比更具信息稳健性,这是因为 AMT 机制的构建仅依赖于估值分布的一阶矩。
英文摘要:
This study examines the mechanism design problem for public goods provision in a large economy with $n$ independent agents. We propose a class of dominant-strategy incentive compatible and ex-post individually rational mechanisms, which we call the adjusted mean-thresholding (AMT) mechanisms. We show that when the cost of provision grows slower than the $\sqrt{n}$-rate, the AMT mechanisms are both eventually ex-ante budget balanced and asymptotically efficient. When the cost grows faster than the $\sqrt{n}$-rate, in contrast, we show that any incentive compatible, individually rational, and eventually ex-ante budget balanced mechanism must have provision probability converging to zero and hence cannot be asymptotically efficient. The AMT mechanisms have a simple form and are more informationally robust when compared to, for example, the second-best mechanism. This is because the construction of an AMT mechanism depends only on the first moment of the valuation distribution.
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