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arXiv 2502.08100econ.TH
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具有群体特定公共物品/坏物品奖励的竞赛中的破坏与搭便车行为

Sabotage and Free Riding in Contests with a Group-Specific Public-Good/Bad Prize

Kyung Hwan Baik, Dongwoo Lee

AI总结:

本研究分析两组竞争群体特定公共物品/坏物品奖励的竞赛,引入考虑破坏行为的竞赛成功函数,发现存在两种纯策略纳什均衡,分别对应无破坏(最高估值者努力)和有破坏(最低估值者努力)的情况。

摘要:

我们研究两组竞争以赢得(或避免赢得)群体特定公共物品/坏物品奖励的竞赛。每组中的每个参与者可付出两种努力:一种是帮助自身所在组赢得奖励,另一种是破坏自身所在组赢得奖励的机会。组内参与者同时且独立地选择努力水平。我们引入一种特定形式的竞赛成功函数,该函数在考虑参与者破坏行为的情况下,确定每组赢得奖励的概率。我们证明,根据参数值的不同,会出现两种纯策略纳什均衡:一种无破坏行为,另一种有破坏行为。在第一种均衡中,每组仅最高估值参与者付出正努力;在第二种均衡中,每组仅最低估值参与者付出正努力。

英文摘要:

We study contests in which two groups compete to win (or not to win) a group-specific public-good/bad prize. Each player in the groups can exert two types of effort: one to help her own group win the prize, and one to sabotage her own group's chances of winning it. The players in the groups choose their effort levels simultaneously and independently. We introduce a specific form of contest success function that determines each group's probability of winning the prize, taking into account players' sabotage activities. We show that two types of purestrategy Nash equilibrium occur, depending on parameter values: one without sabotage activities and one with sabotage activities. In the first type, only the highest-valuation player in each group expends positive effort, whereas, in the second type, only the lowest-valuation player in each group expends positive effort.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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