公共品的稳定菜单:一个匹配问题
Stable Menus of Public Goods: A Matching Problem
AI总结:
针对无货币转移、无容量约束且成本需由足够使用者支撑的公共品提供问题,本文刻画稳定菜单存在的充分与必要条件,并给出防策略稳定匹配的正反结果。
摘要:
我们研究在不存在货币转移的情境中,智能体与公共品之间的匹配问题。由于物品是公共的,它们没有容量约束。不存在外生定义的待提供物品预算。相反,每一种被提供的物品都必须通过被足够多的智能体使用来证明其成本的合理性,这导致物品的“偏好”中存在强互补性。此外,在其他已提供物品给定时需求很高的物品也必须被提供。稳定解(即一份待提供公共品的菜单)的存在性问题展现出丰富的组合结构。我们揭示了保证稳定解存在的充分条件和必要条件,并得出了关于防策略稳定匹配的正面与负面结果。
英文摘要:
We study a matching problem between agents and public goods, in settings without monetary transfers. Since goods are public, they have no capacity constraints. There is no exogenously defined budget of goods to be provided. Rather, each provided good must justify its cost by being utilized by sufficiently many agents, leading to strong complementarities in the "preferences" of goods. Furthermore, goods that are in high demand given other already-provided goods must also be provided. The question of the existence of a stable solution (a menu of public goods to be provided) exhibits a rich combinatorial structure. We uncover sufficient conditions and necessary conditions for guaranteeing the existence of a stable solution, and derive both positive and negative results for strategyproof stable matching.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。