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arXiv 2201.00923econ.TH
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公共品的稳健私人供给

Robust Private Supply of a Public Good

Wanchang Zhang

摘要:

研究了在相关私人价值环境下委托人将公共品出售给一组代理人的机制设计问题。我们假设委托人只知道代理人价值的期望,但不知道价值的联合分布。委托人通过与已知期望一致的联合分布上的最坏情况预期收入来评估机制。我们刻画了两个代理人和一个特殊的$N$ -代理人($N>2$)的情况下,最大最小公共品机制之间的主导策略激励兼容和事后个人理性机制。

英文摘要:

We study the mechanism design problem of selling a public good to a group of agents by a principal in the correlated private value environment. We assume the principal only knows the expectations of the agents' values, but does not know the joint distribution of the values. The principal evaluates a mechanism by the worst-case expected revenue over joint distributions that are consistent with the known expectations. We characterize maxmin public good mechanisms among dominant-strategy incentive compatible and ex-post individually rational mechanisms for the two-agent case and for a special $N$-agent ($N>2$) case.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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