arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv周末暂无论文更新,休息一下吧,周末愉快~~
arXiv 2303.10514econ.TH
收藏

组内与组间高效公共品提供

Efficient Public Good Provision Between and Within Groups

University of Winchester(温彻斯特大学);BPP University(BPP大学);Lancaster University(兰卡斯特大学);Queen’s University Belfast(贝尔法斯特女王大学)

Chowdhury Mohammad Sakib Anwar, Jorge Bruno, Renaud Foucart, Sonali SenGupta

AI总结:

本文研究了在存在位置不确定性和观察学习的情况下,如何通过组内和组间合作实现公共品的高效提供。

摘要:

我们扩展了Gallice和Monzon(2019)的模型,以纳入包含群体、位置不确定性以及观察学习的公共品游戏。贡献是同时在组内发生的,但各组根据对过去贡献不完整样本的观察依次进行游戏。我们证明在固定时间范围内,即使参与者自利,组间和组内完全合作也是可能的。位置不确定性意味着存在一个均衡,其中玩家群体在希望影响后续群体的情况下有条件地合作。条件合作意味着每个群体成员是关键人物,因此组内高效的同时提供是均衡。

英文摘要:

We generalize the model of Gallice and Monzon (2019) to incorporate a public goods game with groups, position uncertainty, and observational learning. Contributions are simultaneous within groups, but groups play sequentially based on their observation of an incomplete sample of past contributions. We show that full cooperation between and within groups is possible with self-interested players on a fixed horizon. Position uncertainty implies the existence of an equilibrium where groups of players conditionally cooperate in the hope of influencing further groups. Conditional cooperation implies that each group member is pivotal, so that efficient simultaneous provision within groups is an equilibrium.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑