多人非对称私人信息消耗战
Multiple-Player War of Attrition with Asymmetric Private Values
AI总结：
本文研究公共品供给中的多人消耗战博弈，结合多人、不完全信息与事前不对称，发现唯一均衡导致分层行为：一人即时供给，他人有严格等待时间，且耐心、成本与声誉影响供给速度。
摘要：
本文研究了一个公共品供给背景下的消耗战博弈，该博弈结合了三个要素：（i）多个参与者，（ii）不完全信息，以及（iii）事前不对称性。在唯一均衡中，不对称性导致了一种分层行为模式，其中一个参与者以正概率立即提供公共品，而其他每个参与者都有一个特定于自身的严格等待时间，在此之前，即使其最高类型也不会提供公共品。比较静态分析表明，耐心较低、供给成本较低且价值声誉较高（以风险率形式表示）的参与者，在类型-wise 上统一更快地提供公共品。在大型社会中，延迟成本主要由即时退出参与者的最高类型决定。
英文摘要：
This paper studies a war of attrition over public good provision among multiple ex-ante asymmetric privately informed players. In equilibrium, asymmetry leads to a stratified behavior pattern in which at most one player provides the public good at time zero with a positive probability, while the other players can become active one after another, each at a player-specific activation time, before which even his highest type does not provide the good. The equilibrium is essentially unique: the types who never provide make the players' costs of providing a saddle point of the equilibrium dynamics. Comparing two players in the same war, I show that the one with lower cost, more impatience, or a value distribution tilted toward high values in the sense of a higher revelation rate provides earlier at every value, other things equal. In large societies, the cost of delay is determined by the highest value across players.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
