发表机构
University of Warsaw; Group for Research in Applied Economics（华沙大学; 应用经济研究组）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
本文提出“反向消耗战”博弈模型，研究等待租金与后动惩罚的权衡，刻画唯一对称均衡，并应用于伯特兰竞争中的定价时机及竞争性维护，扩展至多市场情形。
AI 中文摘要
我们构建了一个完全信息的双人策略时机博弈，称之为反向消耗战（RWoA）。等待会产生严格为正的当前租金，而比对手等待更久的玩家可能获得更高的流量收益。然而，当对手已经行动而自身仍处于等待状态时，会触发一次性的后动者惩罚。其独特的原始设定是玩家拥有的生产性缓冲，该缓冲在等待期间支持租金生成活动，但会因该活动而退化。对手的行动可能提高等待租金并加速缓冲的消耗。我们刻画了一个唯一对称均衡。我们将RWoA应用于同质商品市场中的伯特兰竞争，其中旧库存充当重新定价时机的缓冲时钟。我们还讨论了竞争性维护。作为扩展，我们将双边博弈复制到一系列不相交的异质本地市场的连续统中，并借助精确大数定律，推导出确定性的总体状态份额。
英文摘要
We formulate a complete-information two-player strategic timing game that we refer to as the reverse war of attrition (RWoA). Waiting yields a strictly positive current rent, and the player that outwaits its rival may earn an even higher flow. However, remaining in the waiting state when the rival has moved triggers a discrete late-mover penalty. The distinctive primitive is a player-owned productive buffer which enables the rent-generating activity while waiting, but is degraded by this activity. A rival's move can raise the waiting rent and accelerate depletion. We characterize a unique symmetric equilibrium. We apply RWoA to Bertrand competition in a homogeneous-good market, where vintage inventory serves as the buffer clock for timing repricing. We also discuss competitive maintenance. As an extension, we replicate the bilateral game across a continuum of disjoint heterogeneous local markets and, via the exact law of large numbers, derive deterministic aggregate state shares.
