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arXiv 2406.08936econ.TH
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政治家的机制设计

Mechanism Design by a Politician

University of Fribourg(弗里堡大学)

Giovanni Valvassori Bolgè

AI总结:

本文研究了在智能体私有价值、议程设置者提案需部分赞成及外部选项存在的场景下,占优策略中针对任何外部选项的最优公共物品供给与联盟形成,发现最优供给可能非单调、联盟可能非凸。

摘要:

一组智能体需要就公共物品的供给及其融资做出决策。智能体对公共物品的价值存在异质性,且每个智能体的价值是私有信息。议程设置者有权就公共物品水平和贡献向量提出提案。提案需获得部分智能体的赞成票才能通过。若提案未通过,则实施依赖于类型的外部选项。我刻画了在占优策略下,针对任何外部选项的最优公共物品供给和联盟形成。最优公共物品供给可能是外部选项公共物品水平的非单调函数。此外,最优联盟可能是类型的非凸集。

英文摘要:

A set of agents has to make a decision about the provision of a public good and its financing. Agents have heterogeneous values for the public good and each agent's value is private information. An agenda-setter has the right to make a proposal about a public-good level and a vector of contributions. For the proposal to be approved, only the favourable votes of a majority of agents are needed. If the proposal is not approved, a type-dependent outside option is implemented. I characterize the optimal public-good provision and the coalition-formation for any outside option in dominant strategies. Optimal public-good provision might be a non-monotonic function of the outside option public-good level. Moreover, the optimal coalition might be a non-convex set of types. Importantly, majority voting creates endogenously countervailing incentives among agents.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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