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arXiv 1808.04020econ.TH
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具有News实用程序的机制设计

Mechanism Design with News Utility

Jetlir Duraj

摘要:

新闻效用是这样一种观点,即代理人的效用取决于她对消费和金钱的信念的变化。我们将新闻效用引入到经典的静态贝叶斯机制设计模型中。我们发现,机制的时间轴起着关键作用,即在机制的宣布阶段、参与阶段、发挥阶段和实现阶段之间是否存在延迟。根据时间的不同,具有新闻效用的代理人可以体验到两种额外的新闻效用效应:一种是来自于与前机制信念进行比较的惊喜效应,另一种是来自于将后机制信念与机制的实际结果进行比较的实现效应。我们看两个不同的机制设计设置反映了两个主要的古典文献。在第一个模型中,垄断者根据代理人的损失厌恶程度来筛选代理人。在第二个模型中,我们考虑一个一般的多代理贝叶斯机制设计设置每个球员的不确定性源于不知道其他代理的内在类型。我们给出了拍卖和公共品供应的应用,说明了新闻效用如何改变经典的结果。对于这两个模型,我们表征的最佳设计的时间轴。一个时间轴的特点是在参与和游戏之间没有延迟,但在实现上有延迟,在这两种模式中都不是最优的。在筛选模型中,最佳时间轴是没有延迟的时间轴。在拍卖环境中,在相当自然的假设下,最佳时间轴在机制的所有三个阶段之间都有延迟。

英文摘要:

News utility is the idea that the utility of an agent depends on changes in her beliefs over consumption and money. We introduce news utility into otherwise classical static Bayesian mechanism design models. We show that a key role is played by the timeline of the mechanism, i.e. whether there are delays between the announcement stage, the participation stage, the play stage and the realization stage of a mechanism. Depending on the timing, agents with news utility can experience two additional news utility effects: a surprise effect derived from comparing to pre-mechanism beliefs, as well as a realization effect derived from comparing post-play beliefs with the actual outcome of the mechanism. We look at two distinct mechanism design settings reflecting the two main strands of the classical literature. In the first model, a monopolist screens an agent according to the magnitude of her loss aversion. In the second model, we consider a general multi-agent Bayesian mechanism design setting where the uncertainty of each player stems from not knowing the intrinsic types of the other agents. We give applications to auctions and public good provision which illustrate how news utility changes classical results. For both models we characterize the optimal design of the timeline. A timeline featuring no delay between participation and play but a delay in realization is never optimal in either model. In the screening model the optimal timeline is one without delays. In auction settings, under fairly natural assumptions the optimal timeline has delays between all three stages of the mechanism.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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