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arXiv 1908.00084econ.TH
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新闻敏感度递减的动态信息设计

Dynamic Information Design with Diminishing Sensitivity Over News

Jetlir Duraj, Kevin He

摘要:

贝叶斯代理经历损益效用每个时期的变化,在信念对未来的消费(“新闻效用”),与递减的敏感性的大小的新闻。灵敏度的下降导致了对新闻偏度的偏好:渐进的坏消息,一次性的好消息比一次性的解决方案更糟糕,这反过来又比渐进的好消息,一次性的坏消息更糟糕。因此,智能体在渐进信息和一次性解决方案之间的偏好可以取决于他对不同状态的消费排名。在一个动态的廉价谈话框架中,一个仁慈的发送者在多个时期内传达状态,喋喋不休的均衡基本上是唯一的,没有损失厌恶。与承诺情形相反,更多的损失厌恶型代理人在均衡中可能享有更高的新闻效用。我们的特点是家庭的渐进的好消息均衡存在足够高的损失厌恶,并发现发送者传达了越来越大的好消息。我们讨论了媒体竞争和游戏节目的应用。

英文摘要:

A Bayesian agent experiences gain-loss utility each period over changes in belief about future consumption ("news utility"), with diminishing sensitivity over the magnitude of news. Diminishing sensitivity induces a preference over news skewness: gradual bad news, one-shot good news is worse than one-shot resolution, which is in turn worse than gradual good news, one-shot bad news. So, the agent's preference between gradual information and one-shot resolution can depend on his consumption ranking of different states. In a dynamic cheap-talk framework where a benevolent sender communicates the state over multiple periods, the babbling equilibrium is essentially unique without loss aversion. More loss-averse agents may enjoy higher news utility in equilibrium, contrary to the commitment case. We characterize the family of gradual good news equilibria that exist with high enough loss aversion, and find the sender conveys progressively larger pieces of good news. We discuss applications to media competition and game shows.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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