Tim Roughgarden
EIP-1559 is a proposal to make several tightly coupled additions to Ethereum's transaction fee mechanism, including variable-size blocks and a burned base fee that rises and falls with demand. This report assesses the game-theoretic strengths and weaknesses of the proposal and explores some alternative designs.
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Ethereum Improvement Proposal (EIP) 1559 was recently implemented to transform Ethereum's transaction fee market. EIP-1559 utilizes an algorithmic update rule with a constant learning rate to estimate a base fee. The base fee reflects prevailing network conditions and hence provides a more reliable oracle for current gas prices. Using on-chain data from the period after its launch, we evaluate the impact of EIP-1559 on the user experience and market performance. Our empirical findings suggest that although EIP-1559 achieves its goals on average, short-term behavior is marked by intense, chaoti…
Base Fee Manipulation In Ethereum's EIP-1559 Transaction Fee Mechanism
本文研究了以太坊EIP-1559机制下矿工通过提议空区块操纵基础费的攻击行为，证明算力低于50%的理性矿工也可能从偏离诚实策略中获利，并提出相应的缓解措施。
Participation in permissionless blockchains results in competition over system resources, which needs to be controlled with fees. Ethereum's current fee mechanism is implemented via a first-price auction that results in unpredictable fees as well as other inefficiencies. EIP-1559 is a recent, improved proposal that introduces a number of innovative features such as a dynamically adaptive base fee that is burned, instead of being paid to the miners. Despite intense interest in understanding its properties, several basic questions such as whether and under what conditions does this protocol self…
On the Welfare of EIP-1559 with Patient Bidders
本文研究了EIP-1559算法在耐心投标者假设下的福利问题，证明了该算法在轻度资源增强下能产生近最优福利，并探讨了算法的扩展和未来研究方向。
Dynamic Transaction Scheduling and Pricing in the Ethereum Mempool
本文研究了动态交易调度问题，通过马尔可夫决策过程建模内存池的动态变化，提出基于自然策略梯度算法的优化策略，实现内存池稳定与长期奖励最大化。
The Economic Security of Exponential EIP-1559
本文针对 EIP-1559 及其变体，提出经济安全参数选择方法，通过刻画最小收入分布并构造近似分布，确保超阈值使用时燃料费下限，以遏制滥用并限制状态增长。
Do Rollups Self-Organize? Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning in the EIP-4844 Blob Fee Market
该研究针对EIP-4844 Blob费用市场构建多智能体强化学习环境，发现无协调的独立学习者可使Blob供应接近目标，费用规则可作为去中心化供应的负反馈控制器。
Empirical Analysis of EIP-1559: Transaction Fees, Waiting Time, and Consensus Security
本研究利用以太坊链上、内存池及交易所数据，实证分析EIP-1559对交易费用、等待时间及共识安全的影响，发现其改善用户体验但影响有限，并揭示价格波动与区块大小的影响，为TFM改进提供方向。
A Treatment of EIP-1559: Enhancing Transaction Fee Mechanism through Nth-Price Auction
本文提出名为BNP的燃烧式N价拍卖交易费机制，将费用分为基础费和优先费，在拥堵时同时满足UIC、MIC和c-SCP，且不受共识类型限制。
Transaction fee markets are essential components of blockchain economies, as they resolve the inherent scarcity in the number of transactions that can be added to each block. In early blockchain protocols, this scarcity was resolved through a first-price auction in which users were forced to guess appropriate bids from recent blockchain data. Ethereum's EIP-1559 fee market reform streamlines this process through the use of a base fee that is increased (or decreased) whenever a block exceeds (or fails to meet) a specified target block size. Previous work has found that the EIP-1559 mechanism ma…
Transaction Fee Mechanism Design
本文通过机制设计研究区块链交易费用机制，提出两种激励相容性条件，证明EIP-1559满足这些条件，并引入“无小费机制”作为替代方案。
EIP-4844 Economics and Rollup Strategies
本文研究 EIP-4844 下 blob 固定收费与延迟成本对 rollup 数据发布策略的影响，分析常规区块空间选择、共享 blob 的均衡成本及成本分摊规则。
Optimal Dynamic Fees for Blockchain Resources
本文提出一个通用框架，用于最优设计多区块链资源的动态费用机制，能权衡需求变化与噪声、处理资源间交叉效应，并实证优于 EIP-1559。
Dynamic Posted-Price Mechanisms for the Blockchain Transaction Fee Market
本文针对区块链交易费波动问题提出动态标价机制，利用区块利用率和历史出价计算标价，并证明在需求稳定时该机制可近似福利最优且价格稳定。
Price Elasticity of Gas Demand on L1 and L2: Evidence from Ethereum and Arbitrum
利用工具变量法估计以太坊主网和Arbitrum One上天然气需求的价格弹性，发现两者总体缺乏弹性，但L2弹性更大，且不同资源类型和用户集群弹性差异显著。
Multiple Proposer Transaction Fee Mechanism Design: Robust Incentives Against Censorship and Bribery
通过贝叶斯博弈扩展交易费用机制框架，分析多提议者协议FOCIL在贿赂攻击下的抗审查性，并评估其激励兼容性。
Transaction fees represent a major incentive in many blockchain systems as a way to incentivize processing transactions. Unfortunately, they also introduce an enormous amount of incentive asymmetry compared to alternatives like fixed block rewards. We analyze some of the incentive compatibility issues that arise from transaction fees, which relate to the bids that users submit, the allocation rules that miners use to choose which transactions to include, and where they choose to mine in the context of longest-chain consensus. We start by surveying a variety of mining attacks including undercut…
Public blockchains implement a fee mechanism to allocate scarce computational resources across competing transactions. Most existing fee market designs utilize a joint, fungible unit of account (e.g., gas in Ethereum) to price otherwise non-fungible resources such as bandwidth, computation, and storage, by hardcoding their relative prices. Fixing the relative price of each resource in this way inhibits granular price discovery, limiting scalability and opening up the possibility of denial-of-service attacks. As a result, many prominent networks such as Ethereum and Solana have proposed multi-d…
Transaction Fee Market Design for Parallel Execution
针对区块链并行执行中费用市场未区分存储键访问负载的问题，提出包含气体计算机制和交易费用机制的框架，并评估出加权面积与时间比例完工时间两种候选方案。
Revisiting the Primitives of Transaction Fee Mechanism Design
本文研究区块链交易费机制，提出抗链下影响性，揭示 EIP-1559 的缺陷，并证明含该性质的强不可能性。
Tiered Mechanisms for Blockchain Transaction Fees
针对区块链交易费用机制在拥塞期间缺乏包容性的问题，本文提出一种分层定价机制，通过形式化证明和实验表明其能保持期望价格稳定、降低低紧迫性交易费用并维持收入，优于 EIP-1559。
Multidimensional Blockchain Fees are (Essentially) Optimal
本文证明多维区块链费用市场在温和假设下即使面对最坏情况对手也本质最优，简单的 EIP-1559 式价格更新算法相对预言机最优定价的平均福利差距为 $O(1/\sqrt{T})$，并给出匹配下界。
Bandwidth Fee Mechanisms for Certified Transaction Dissemination
研究共识前认证交易传播的带宽费用机制，提出贪心路由标价机制实现个体激励相容，并设计EIP-1559式价格更新规则保证稳定性。
In blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereum, users compete in a transaction fee auction to get their transactions confirmed in the next block. A line of recent works set forth the desiderata for a "dream" transaction fee mechanism (TFM), and explored whether such a mechanism existed. A dream TFM should satisfy 1) user incentive compatibility (UIC), i.e., truthful bidding should be a user's dominant strategy; 2) miner incentive compatibility (MIC), i.e., the miner's dominant strategy is to faithfully implement the prescribed mechanism; and 3) miner-user side contract proofness (SCP), i.e., no c…
Collusion-Resilience in Transaction Fee Mechanism Design
针对交易费机制设计，本文首次证明在交易存在竞争时，没有任何机制能同时满足用户激励兼容、矿工激励兼容和OCA-proofness，解决了Roughgarden (EC'21)的开放问题，并提出了规避该不可能性结果的模型放松方案。
Stackelberg Attacks on Auctions and Blockchain Transaction Fee Mechanisms
该研究提出针对拍卖与区块链交易费机制的Stackelberg攻击策略，攻击者通过策略承诺可免费获得物品并迫使其他智能体配合，在估值集中、拍卖低拥堵等条件下对多种拍卖及EIP-1559机制有效，会造成拍卖方收入大幅损失。
Smart Contracts and transactions allow users to implement elaborate constructions on cryptocurrency blockchains like Bitcoin and Ethereum. Many of these constructions, including operational payment channels and atomic swaps, use a building block called Hashed Time-Locked Contract (HTLC). In this work, we distill from HTLC a specification (HTLC-Spec), and present an implementation called Mutual-Assured-Destruction Hashed Time-Locked Contract (MAD-HTLC). MAD-HTLC employs a novel approach of utilizing the existing blockchain operators, called miners, as part of the design. If a user misbehaves, M…
Determining Blockchain Transaction Timing and Fee with Observable Mempools
本文研究了区块链中战略用户如何通过观察内存池确定交易时间和费用，分析了不同区块间隔分布下的最优策略。
Blockchains, and specifically smart contracts, have promised to create fair and transparent trading ecosystems. Unfortunately, we show that this promise has not been met. We document and quantify the widespread and rising deployment of arbitrage bots in blockchain systems, specifically in decentralized exchanges (or "DEXes"). Like high-frequency traders on Wall Street, these bots exploit inefficiencies in DEXes, paying high transaction fees and optimizing network latency to frontrun, i.e., anticipate and exploit, ordinary users' DEX trades. We study the breadth of DEX arbitrage bots in a subse…
Side Contract Commitment Attacks on Blockchains
本研究发现区块链上智能体可部署侧合约会打破传统博弈均衡，提出侧合约韧性概念，验证两款去中心化商务合约的韧性差异，并展示针对首价拍卖及EIP-1559的侧合约攻击，指出该问题对智能合约安全部署的重要性。
Mechanism Design for Blockchain Order Books against Selfish Miners
针对区块链订单簿中矿工自私匹配导致社会福利损失的问题，提出可调整区块大小的机制，实现有界PoA，并在同质交易下达到社会最优，显著提升福利。
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