交易费机制设计中的抗共谋性
Collusion-Resilience in Transaction Fee Mechanism Design
AI总结：
针对交易费机制设计，本文首次证明在交易存在竞争时，没有任何机制能同时满足用户激励兼容、矿工激励兼容和OCA-proofness，解决了Roughgarden (EC'21)的开放问题，并提出了规避该不可能性结果的模型放松方案。
摘要：
用户在交易费机制（TFM）中出价，以使其交易被区块链协议包含并确认。Roughgarden (EC'21) 发起了对 TFM 的形式化处理，并提出了三个要求：用户激励兼容性（UIC）、矿工激励兼容性（MIC）以及一种称为 OCA-proofness 的抗共谋性形式。以太坊的 EIP-1559 机制在交易之间没有竞争时同时满足所有三个属性，但当有太多符合条件的交易无法放入单个区块时，就会失去 UIC 属性。Chung 和 Shi (SODA'23) 考虑了一种替代的抗共谋性概念，称为 $c$-边契约证明性（$c$-SCP），并证明当交易之间存在竞争时，没有任何 TFM 能同时满足 UIC、MIC 和 $c$-SCP（对于任何 $c\geq 1$）。OCA-proofness 断言用户和矿工不应能够“从协议中窃取”。另一方面，$c$-SCP 条件要求矿工和一部分用户组成的联盟不应能够通过策略性偏离获利（无论以牺牲协议为代价还是以联盟外用户为代价）。我们的主要结果是首次证明，当交易之间存在竞争时，没有任何（可能是随机的）用户预期会诚实出价的 TFM 能同时满足 UIC、MIC 和 OCA-proofness。这一结果解决了 Roughgarden (EC'21) 中的主要开放问题。我们还建议了对基本模型的几种放松，使得我们的不可能性结果得以规避。
英文摘要：
Users bid in a transaction fee mechanism (TFM) to get their transactions included and confirmed by a blockchain protocol. Roughgarden (EC'21) initiated the formal treatment of TFMs and proposed three requirements: user incentive compatibility (UIC), miner incentive compatibility (MIC), and a form of collusion-resilience called OCA-proofness. Ethereum's EIP-1559 mechanism satisfies all three properties simultaneously when there is no contention between transactions, but loses the UIC property when there are too many eligible transactions to fit in a single block. Chung and Shi (SODA'23) considered an alternative notion of collusion-resilience, called $c$-side-contract-proofness ($c$-SCP), and showed that, when there is contention between transactions, no TFM can satisfy UIC, MIC, and $c$-SCP for any $c\geq 1$. OCA-proofness asserts that the users and a miner should not be able to "steal from the protocol." On the other hand, the $c$-SCP condition requires that a coalition of a miner and a subset of users should not be able to profit through strategic deviations (whether at the expense of the protocol or of the users outside the coalition). Our main result is the first proof that, when there is contention between transactions, no (possibly randomized) TFM in which users are expected to bid truthfully satisfies UIC, MIC, and OCA-proofness.This result resolves the main open question in Roughgarden (EC'21). We also suggest several relaxations of the basic model that allow our impossibility result to be circumvented.
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