发表机构
Carnegie Mellon University; Oblivious Labs; LayerZero Labs; Columbia University（卡内基梅隆大学; Oblivious Labs; LayerZero Labs; 哥伦比亚大学）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
Otter是一种双资产批量自动做市商，通过盈余再分配实现抗MEV性，使用户和构建者诚实行为成为占优策略，可最大化社会福利，需共识层提供抗审查性。
AI 中文摘要
自动做市商（AMM）中的矿工可提取价值（MEV）使区块构建者能够从交易排序和注入交易中获利，这给用户带来成本并加剧了构建者的中心化。我们引入Otter（Optimal Truthful Trading with Excess Redistribution，即最优诚实交易与超额再分配），这是一种双资产批量AMM，当共识层提供抗审查性且区块空间未拥堵时，它可实现可证明的MEV弹性。Otter使用户和构建者的诚实行为成为占优策略，因此构建者无法从战略偏差中获利，包括重新排序出价或注入女巫出价，即使构建者本身是具有内在价值的交易者。此外，我们证明，在满足期望博弈论性质的自然机制类中，Otter在强意义上最大化社会福利。为实现这些保证，我们引入了一种称为盈余再分配的新范式，它通过将剩余盈余重定向给更广泛的社区，可证明地防止剩余盈余被捕获为MEV。具体而言，池的输出代币无需在当前批次的用户之间全部分配，剩余盈余可转移到由去中心化社区管理的智能合约中，累积的盈余可用于惠及社区成员，例如补贴交易费、奖励流动性提供者或返还给池。我们的方法依赖于底层共识层提供抗审查性，我们通过一个不可能性结果说明其必要性，该结果表明，当构建者额外被允许审查交易时，期望的博弈论保证将无法实现。因此，我们的结果还提供了数学上的正式证明，说明共识级安全保证如何从根本上扩展应用层可实现的内容。
英文摘要
Miner extractable value (MEV) in automated market makers allows block builders to profit from transaction ordering and injected trades, imposing costs on users and contributing to builder centralization. We introduce Otter (Optimal Truthful Trading with Excess Redistribution), a two-asset batch AMM that achieves provable MEV resilience when the consensus layer provides censorship resilience and block space is uncongested. Otter makes truthful behavior a dominant strategy for both users and builders. Consequently, a builder cannot profit from strategic deviations, including reordering bids or injecting sybil bids, even when the builder is itself a trader with intrinsic value. Moreover, we show that Otter maximizes social welfare, in a strong sense, within a natural class of mechanisms satisfying the desired game-theoretic properties. To achieve these guarantees, we introduce a new paradigm called surplus redistribution, which provably prevents residual surplus from being captured as MEV by redirecting it to the broader community. Specifically, the pool's output tokens need not be distributed entirely among users in the current batch. Instead, residual surplus may be transferred to a smart contract governed by the decentralized community. The accumulated surplus can be used to benefit community members --- for example, by subsidizing transaction fees, rewarding liquidity providers, or returning assets to the pool. Our approach relies on the underlying consensus layer to provide censorship resilience. We motivate its necessity through an impossibility result showing that the desired game-theoretic guarantees become unattainable when the builder is additionally allowed to censor transactions. Thus, our results also provide a mathematically formal demonstration of how consensus-level security guarantees can fundamentally expand what is achievable at the application layer.
CommentsAbstract shortened to comply with arXiv's character limit
