具有内生感知的机制设计
Mechanism Design with Endogenous Perception
AI总结:
本文研究单一代理人筛选问题中私人信息感知的内生形成,提出注意力激励的一般表示并定义感知准确性概念,揭示感知与机制设计之间的双向塑造关系。
摘要:
我们为单一代理人筛选问题中的私人信息内生感知建模,并考虑潜在的评估误差。代理人对自身类型的评估取决于其认知状态:要么是专注的(即他们正确感知自己的类型),要么是不专注的(即他们可能错误感知自己的类型)。机制的激励结构通过认知上的有成本投资来决定代理人的认知状态。我们推导出注意力激励的一般表示,展示其如何随机制的分配规则而变化,并定义感知准确性的概念。在应用中,我们展示了感知如何塑造机制设计,又如何被机制设计所塑造。
英文摘要:
We model endogenous perception of private information in single-agent screening problems, with potential evaluation errors. The agent's evaluation of their type depends on their cognitive state: either attentive (i.e., they correctly perceive their type) or inattentive (i.e., they might misperceive their type). The mechanism's incentives structure determines the agent's cognitive state via costly investment in cognition. We derive a general representation of attention incentives, show how they vary with the mechanism's allocation rule, and define a notion of accuracy of perception. In applications we showcase how perception both shapes and is shaped by the design of mechanisms.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。