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arXiv 2103.05788econ.THcs.GT
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向具有内生信息的智能体出售数据

Selling Data to an Agent with Endogenous Information

Yingkai Li

AI总结:

研究数据中介向具有内生信息的智能体出售信息的收益最大化问题,发现最优机制需提供部分信息,但设定确定性价格揭示完整信息也能获得至少一半的最优收益。

摘要:

我们考虑一个数据中介向单一智能体出售信息以最大化其收益的模型。智能体对额外信息具有私人估值,在收到数据中介的信号后,智能体可以开展自己的实验,以额外成本细化她对状态的后验信念。为最大化预期收益,仅提供完整信息通常是次优的,最优机制可能包含一系列连续的菜单选项(提供部分信息),以防止智能体有动机从其他来源获取额外信息。然而,我们的主要结果表明,价格歧视带来的额外收益是有限的,即对于任意先验和成本函数,为揭示完整信息设定确定性价格可获得至少一半的最优收益。

英文摘要:

We consider a model of a data broker selling information to a single agent to maximize his revenue. The agent has a private valuation of the additional information, and upon receiving the signal from the data broker, the agent can conduct her own experiment to refine her posterior belief on the states with additional costs. To maximize expected revenue, only offering full information in general is suboptimal, and the optimal mechanism may contain a continuum of menu options with partial information to prevent the agent from having incentives to acquire additional information from other sources. However, our main result shows that the additional benefit from price discrimination is limited, i.e., posting a deterministic price for revealing full information obtains at least half of the optimal revenue for arbitrary prior and cost functions.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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