We consider a model of a data broker selling information to a single agent to maximize his revenue. The agent has a private valuation of the additional information, and upon receiving the signal from the data broker, the agent can conduct her own experiment to refine her posterior belief on the states with additional costs. To maximize expected revenue, only offering full information in general is suboptimal, and the optimal mechanism may contain a continuum of menu options with partial information to prevent the agent from having incentives to acquire additional information from other sources. However, our main result shows that the additional benefit from price discrimination is limited, i.e., posting a deterministic price for revealing full information obtains at least half of the optimal revenue for arbitrary prior and cost functions.
Square-Root Price Impact Is Necessary for Endogenous Manipulation Cycles in Learning-Agent Markets
Institute of Natural Sciences, Westlake Institute for Advanced Study(西湖高等研究院自然科学研究所);Department of Physics, School of Science and Research Center for Industries of the Future, Westlake University(西湖大学理学院未来产业研究中心);Greatwall Cigar Factory of China Tobacco Sichuan Industrial Co., Ltd.(中国烟草四川工业有限公司长城雪茄厂);Southwestern University of Finance and Economics(西南财经大学)
A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Empirical Revenue Maximization Algorithm with Endogenous Sampling
Peking University(北京大学);Technion - Israel Institute of Technology(以色列理工学院);Hong Kong University of Science and Technology(香港科技大学);Alibaba Group(阿里巴巴集团);Shanghai Jiao Tong University(上海交通大学)
经验收益最大化(ERM)是拍卖设计中最重要的价格学习算法之一:文献表明,它可以在重复拍卖和统一价格拍卖中学习到收益最大化拍卖者的近似最优保留价。然而,在这些应用程序中,提供输入的机构有动机操纵输入,以降低输出的价格。我们概括了Lavi et al(2019)提出的激励意识度量的定义,以量化由于$N$输入样本中的$m\ge 1$的变化而导致的ERM输出价格的降低,并提供了该度量到零的特定收敛率,因为对于不同类型的输入分布,$N$趋于无穷大。通过采用这一措施,我们构建了一个有效的,近似激励兼容的,和收入最优的学习算法使用ERM在重复拍卖对非近视投标人,并显示近似组激励兼容统一价格拍卖。