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arXiv 2405.04764econ.TH
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在变化环境中数据驱动的监控与威慑

Data-Driven Monitoring and Deterrence in a Changing Environment

Columbia University(哥伦比亚大学);Hong Kong University of Science and Technology(香港科技大学);University College London(伦敦大学学院)

Yeon-Koo Che, Jinwoo Kim, Konrad Mierendorff

AI总结:

本文研究了一个动态模型,其中主导者基于历史违规数据监控代理人,数据决定了监控的时间和强度。通过马尔可夫过程建模环境变化,发现短视策略使历史数据无价值,但内在探索动机成为内生承诺机制,降低违规率并恢复威慑力。

摘要:

我们研究了一个动态模型,其中主导者根据历史违规数据监控代理人。该数据决定了何时以及以何种强度进行监控;监控决策反过来决定了收集的数据,影响主导者的未来学习。我们使用带饵模型分析这种反馈循环,其中底层监控环境根据隐藏的马尔可夫过程演变。由于数据收集是内生的,主导者如何利用这些信息至关重要:出人意料的是,短视策略使历史数据完全无价值。通过内生化代理人的激励,我们证明主导者纯粹的信息动机去探索成为内生承诺机制。这种内在驱动力迫使持续警惕,严格降低均衡违规率并恢复威慑力。

英文摘要:

We study a dynamic model in which a principal monitors agents based on historical data of infractions. This data informs when and at what intensity to monitor; the monitoring decision, in turn, selects the collected data, shaping the principal's future learning. We analyze this feedback loop using a bandit model in which the underlying monitoring environment evolves according to a hidden Markov process. Because data collection is endogenous, how the principal uses this information is critical: surprisingly, a myopic approach renders historical data completely valueless. By endogenizing the agent's incentives, we demonstrate that the principal's purely informational motive to explore serves as an endogenous commitment device. This inherent drive to gather data compels persistent vigilance, strictly lowering the equilibrium infraction rate and restoring the power of deterrence.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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