出售两种互补商品
Selling two complementary goods
摘要:
卖方向代理商出售一对可分割的互补商品。代理人只按特定比例消费商品,并自由处置任何一种商品的多余部分。捆绑的价值和比率是代理的私人信息。在这个二维类型空间模型中,我们的激励约束的特点,并表明,最佳的(预期收入最大化)机制是一个比率依赖的张贴价格或张贴价格机制的一类分布。我们还表明,最佳机制是一个张贴的价格机制时,价值和比率是独立分布。
英文摘要:
A seller is selling a pair of divisible complementary goods to an agent. The agent consumes the goods only in a specific ratio and freely disposes of excess in either goods. The value of the bundle and the ratio are private information of the agent. In this two-dimensional type space model, we characterize the incentive constraints and show that the optimal (expected revenue-maximizing) mechanism is a ratio-dependent posted price or a posted price mechanism for a class of distributions. We also show that the optimal mechanism is a posted price mechanism when the value and the ratio are independently distributed.
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