分配位置性商品:一种机制设计方法
Allocating Positional Goods: A Mechanism Design Approach
AI总结:
研究位置性商品最优分配,用机制设计方法,通过优化条件描述可行分配,分析收益最大化及福利最大化机制,包括单一等级销售、覆盖范围变化对消费者剩余的影响,以及有无补贴时的情况。
摘要:
我研究位置性商品的最优分配,消费者对相对消费的关注会产生外部性。其应用包括奢侈品、优先服务、教育和组织层级等。采用机制设计方法,通过一个优化条件来描述可行分配。在迈尔森正则性下,收益最大化机制能完全区分参与的买家,底部可能存在排除情况。销售单一等级至少能保证获得最大收益的一半。当服务所有买家时,在失效率递增(IFR)情况下,限制卖家为单一等级会增加消费者剩余。当卖家限于单一等级时,在IFR下扩大覆盖范围对消费者有益,否则可能有害。我还刻画了有无补贴时的福利最大化机制。
英文摘要:
I study the optimal allocation of positional goods, where consumers' concern for relative consumption creates externalities. Applications include luxury goods, priority services, education, and organizational hierarchies. Using a mechanism design approach, I characterize feasible allocations through a majorization condition. Under Myerson regularity, the revenue-maximizing mechanism fully separates participating buyers, with possible exclusion at the bottom. Selling a single level guarantees at least half the maximum revenue. When all buyers are served, restricting the seller to a single level increases consumer surplus under an increasing failure rate (IFR). When the seller is restricted to a single level, expanding coverage also benefits consumers under IFR but may harm them otherwise. I also characterize the welfare-maximizing mechanism with and without subsidies.
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