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arXiv 2512.20001econ.TH
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分配共同价值物品

Allocating Common-Value Goods

Nagoya University(名古屋大学);Massachusetts Institute of Technology(麻省理工学院)

Hiroto Sato, Ryo Shirakawa

AI总结:

本文研究了在无货币交易情况下最大化共同价值物品分配的问题,通过机制筛选代理人私有信息并影响其对物品价值的学习,最优机制由两个参数决定,可能排除部分代理人并导致即使所有代理人愿意接收时也 withholding 分配。

摘要:

我们研究了一个简单的共同价值物品分配问题。设计者希望在无货币交易的情况下尽可能多地将物品分配给单位需求的代理人,而持有部分私人信息的代理人只愿意接收物品当其价值高时。机制利用其他代理人的信息来筛选每个代理人的私人信息,并在此过程中影响代理人从其他代理人那里学到的物品价值。最优机制可以由两个参数总结:一个调整分配概率,另一个由分配诱导的学习量决定。尽管设计者希望分配物品,最优机制会排除一些代理人,因此即使所有代理人都愿意接收,也可能 withholding 分配。当允许支付时,最优机制的结构相同,但可能不排除任何代理人,且可能涉及严格正的递减支付。

英文摘要:

We study a simple problem of allocating common-value goods. The designer seeks to allocate the goods to as many unit-demand agents as possible without monetary transfers, while agents, who possess partial private information about the goods, are willing to receive them only when the goods are of high value. Mechanisms screen each agent's private information using the information of other agents, and in doing so shape what agents learn from other agents about the value of the goods. The optimal mechanism can be summarized by two parameters: one adjusts the allocation probability, while the other governs the amount of learning induced by allocation. Although the designer prefers to allocate the goods, the optimal mechanism excludes some agents and, as a result, may withhold allocation even when all agents would be willing to receive them. The optimal mechanism has the same structure even when payments are available, but it does not exclude any agent and involves strictly positive payments that are not increasing in allocation probability.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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