抽卡游戏:当前景理论遇上最优定价
Gacha Game: When Prospect Theory Meets Optimal Pricing
AI总结:
本文针对具有前景理论偏好、存在动态不一致性的两类买家,分别得出抽卡游戏的最优定价机制:幼稚买家对应固定概率战利品宝箱,成熟买家需增设连续失败后的全价购买保障。
摘要:
本文研究向具有前景理论偏好的买家出售单件商品的最优定价过程。在存在概率加权的情况下,买家存在动态不一致性,且对自身不一致性可能是成熟的或幼稚的。若买家是幼稚的,唯一最优机制是出售“战利品宝箱”,每期以固定概率开出商品。相比之下,若买家是成熟的,唯一最优机制会引入最坏情况保障:在买家此前所有战利品宝箱连续抽卡失败后,可按全价购买商品。
英文摘要:
I study the optimal pricing process for selling a unit good to a buyer with prospect theory preferences. In the presence of probability weighting, the buyer is dynamically inconsistent and can be either sophisticated or naive about her own inconsistency. If the buyer is naive, the uniquely optimal mechanism is to sell a ``loot box'' that delivers the good with some constant probability in each period. In contrast, if the buyer is sophisticated, the uniquely optimal mechanism introduces worst-case insurance: after successive failures in obtaining the good from all previous loot boxes, the buyer can purchase the good at full price.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。