持续时间内的内生贫困陷阱:一种信号方法
Endogenous Poverty Traps in Continuous Time: A Signaling Approach
AI总结:
本文通过信号方法研究持续时间内生贫困陷阱,揭示了信号成本如何导致结构性贫困陷阱,以及消费倾向的组合特征如何区分该陷阱与流动性约束和暂时性冲击。
摘要:
本文将信号摩擦嵌入到连续时间异质代理人框架中。一个连续生产者群体经营柯布-道格拉斯技术,具有特定制度的生产率A_j∈{A_L, A_H}。随机出现的信号机会和技能过时风险产生了一个最优停止问题——何时支付一笔 lump-sum 成本ϕ来提升生产率——其解得出一个内生的Skiba阈值k*。递减收益在每个制度中产生一个稳定的内部吸引子;信号成本将两个盆地分开,产生一个贫困陷阱,它是内部最优解而非角落解。稳态分布呈现双峰,但其按制度分解显示,处于三个不同状态的代理人——结构性被困、等待信号、成功升级——在相同财富水平上共存,具有不同的消费行为和流动性前景。资本本身因此不足以确定代理人在极化动态中的位置。我们表明,低边际消费倾向和高平均消费倾向的联合观察——一种标准欧拉方程测试无法察觉的组合——是结构性陷阱的诊断特征,将其与流动性约束和暂时性冲击区分开来。
英文摘要:
This paper embeds a signaling friction into the continuous-time heterogeneous agent framework. A continuum of producers operate Cobb-Douglas technologies with regime-specific productivity $A_j \in \{A_L, A_H\}$. Stochastic arrival of signaling opportunities and skill obsolescence risk generate an optimal stopping problem -- when to pay a lump-sum cost $ϕ$ to upgrade productivity -- whose solution yields an endogenous Skiba threshold $k^*$. Diminishing returns create a stable interior attractor in each regime; the signaling cost separates the two basins, producing a poverty trap that is an interior optimum rather than a corner solution. The stationary distribution exhibits Twin Peaks, but its decomposition by regime reveals that agents in three distinct states -- structurally trapped, waiting to signal, and successfully upgraded -- coexist at the same wealth levels with different consumption behavior and mobility prospects. Capital alone is therefore insufficient to identify an agent's position in the polarization dynamics. We show that the joint observation of a low marginal propensity to consume out of wealth and a high average propensity to consume -- a combination invisible to standard Euler equation tests -- is the diagnostic signature of the structural trap, distinguishing it from both liquidity constraints and transitory shocks.
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