机制设计中的概率验证
Probabilistic Verification in Mechanism Design
AI总结:
该研究提出机制设计下的概率验证模型,刻画类型甄别测试的存在条件,推导测试技术的简化形式并求解利润最大化机制,揭示验证技术变化时机制解的连续插值规律。
摘要:
我们提出了机制设计中的一种概率验证模型。委托人先从代理人处获取信息,随后选择一项测试交由代理人完成。代理人的真实类型决定了其通过每项测试的概率。我们刻画了每类代理人是否存在一项能最佳甄别所有其他类型的对应测试。若该条件成立,测试技术可表示为一种易处理的简化形式。我们利用该简化形式求解带验证的利润最大化机制。随着验证技术的变化,解在无验证解与完全剩余抽取之间连续插值。
英文摘要:
We introduce a model of probabilistic verification in mechanism design. The principal elicits a message from the agent and then selects a test to give the agent. The agent's true type determines the probability with which he can pass each test. We characterize whether each type has an associated test that best screens out all other types. If this condition holds, then the testing technology can be represented in a tractable reduced form. We use this reduced form to solve for profit-maximizing mechanisms with verification. As the verification technology varies, the solution continuously interpolates between the no-verification solution and full surplus extraction.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。