AI 中文总结
本文研究带容量约束验证的最优序贯分配问题，刻画了最优机制类别，发现剩余物品数超可用验证次数时最优机制可含概率性验证。
AI 中文摘要
委托人需在n个序贯到达且不耐烦的代理人中分配k个相同物品，每个代理人私下观察自身估值，委托人分配物品的收益取决于接收者的估值。委托人最多可对m个代理人的估值进行完美验证（m<k），且在任何代理人到达前会承诺一种机制。我们刻画了最优机制的类别，主要结果表明，在剩余物品数量超过可用验证次数的状态下，最优机制可能包含概率性验证。
英文摘要
A principal seeks to allocate $k$ identical objects among n sequentially arriving, impatient agents. Each agent privately observes her valuation, and the principal's payoff from allocating an object depends on the recipient's valuation. The principal can perfectly verify the valuation of at most $m$ agents, where $m < k$, and commits to a mechanism before any agent arrives. We characterize the class of optimal mechanisms. Our main result establishes that, in states where the number of remaining objects exceeds the number of available verification checks, the optimal mechanism may involve probabilistic verification.
